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SUMMARY 
In this paper, we will try to take a closer look at the rise of the democratic transition 
in two French-speaking West African countries: Benin, often referred to as "the 
country where it all started", and Niger that can be considered as one of the weak 
copies of the Beninese model. In the first part of the paper, we will try to show 
how the democratic experiment took place in both countries and how private and 
government-owned media came to play an active role in all main political changes. 
In the second part, we will take a closer look at the role of the new private written 
press in the democratic transition and try to mention the main problems facing 
both the press and the democracy implementation. Eventually, we will mention 
the recent political events that occurred in Benin and Niger, showing that the 
democratic process has generated very different outcomes. 
KEYWORDS: Africa, Benin, Niger, democracy, press, mass-media, democratic 
transition 
85 Introduction 
In 1989, on the eve of what has been called "the African spring", the media in 
the French-speaking countries of West Africa were totally underdeveloped and 
government-controlled. Except for Senegal, which has always had a particular 
status and history, all countries were under authoritarian civil or military rule 
and the freedom of the press, even if mentioned in the Constitutions or fundamental 
texts, did not have any real existence. The media were supposed to serve " national 
integration" and "development" but were in fact devoted to the praise of the political 
leaders or the one-party system. 
The underdevelopment of those media was not only the consequence of dictatorship 
but could be traced back to colonial times. In fact, France has always had a very 
oppressive attitude towards African-owned press in its colonies, while the British 
were much more open to local press (Ziegler and Asante, 1992). That is one 
of the main reasons why the first newspaper controlled by Africans in French 
Africa only appeared in 1920 in Dahomey (currently Benin)
1, more than a century 
after the first "indigenous" newspapers in English.
2 
In 1960, when the West African French Territories reached Independence
3, only 
two of them, Senegal and Ivory Coast, had a daily, owned by a French businessman. 
The new governments quickly evolved towards authoritarian regimes, persecuting 
the opposition and private press until they disappeared or were forbidden. In the 
name of "nation building" and "development", they imposed state monopoly on 
all media and the wave of military coups in the early '70s usually reinforced that 
tendency. But at the end of the '80s, the "wind of democracy" reached Africa, 
private newspapers appeared and the media became active participants in most 
democratic transitions. 
1. Other reasons can be found in the very low literacy rate and the weak economy in 
French Africa (Ainslie, 1966). 
2. The first West African newspaper was created in Liberia in 1802. It was soon followed 
by publications in the British colonies of Sierre Leone, Nigeria and Gold Coast. In 1900, 
about 70 newspapers were edited in British West Africa and Liberia, most of it political 
and hold by Africans (Barton, 1979). 
3. Only Guinea, which had voted "no" at the French referendum in 1958, following 
nationalist leader Sékou Touré, had become independent in 1958. 
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Benin : Main Newspapers during the Transition Period (March 1990-April 1991) 
Name  Editor (ownership)  date of 
creation 
periodicity  circulation*  location  size  price 
(Transition) @ 
La Croix
 5  Barhelemy Assogba 
(Catholic Church) 
1 949  fortnightly  Cotonou 
Ehuzu/La Nation
 s  Minist.of Communication 
(State) 
1 975  daily  3000-5000  Cotonou  8p 
La Gazette du Golfe
 5  Ismael Soumanou 
(Private) 
March 1988 fortnightly then 
weekly (90) 
15000->5000  Cotonou  16p  200 FCFA 
Tam-Tam Express
 5  Denis Hodonou (Private)  June 1988  fortnightly  8000->5000  Cotonou 
La Récade  Thomas Megnassan 
(Private) 
June 1989  Bimestriel then 
monthly (90) 
7000->3000  Cotonou  24->16p  250 FCFA 
L'Opinion  Paulin Hountondji 
(Private) 
Feb.1990  +/- 5000  Cotonou  16p  200 FCFA 
Le Forum de la Semaine
1  Bruno Sodehou (Private)  Apr.1990  weekly  +/- 5000  Cotonou  16 p  200 FCFA 
Libération  Antonin Nicoué (Private)  March 1990 weekly  +/- 3000  12p  100-150 FCFA 
Je Sais Tout 
(advertisment) 
Mathieu Tchibozo 
(Private) 
Apr.1990  fortnightly  +/- 3000  Cotonou  12p  150 FCFA 
L'Observateur  François Comlan 
(Private) 
June 1990  weekly  +/- 3000  12p  200 FCFA 
Le Soleil  Edgard Kaho (Private)  March 1990 fortnightly  +/- 3000  Cotonou  12->8p  150->100 FCFA 
24 Heures  Pascal Gandaho (Private)  Oct. 1990  daily  +/- 2000  Cotonou  8p  100 FCFA 
La Voix du Bénin  Gaston de Souza (Private)  Feb.1991  bi-weekly  +/- 2000  Cotonou  8p  50->100 FCFA 
Le Canard du Golfe 
(Humoristic) 
Louis Tingbo (Private)  April 1990  irregular  Cotonou  8p  250->200 FCFA 
Le Quotidien  Soton Moulero (Private)  irregular  Cotonou  8p  100 FCFA 
L'Indépendant  Abdoul Gafari Fassassi 
(Private) 
April 1990  irregular  Cotonou  8p  200 FCFA 
Others (irregular) : Trait d'Union, Bienvenue au Bénin, L'Eveil, Bénin Nouveau, Point de Mire, L'Union, Libertés, La Flamme, Liberté 
et Culture, Actualités Eonomiques, Le Renouveau, Le Satirique, Horizons nouveaux,... 
# The newspapers mentioned are the ones reporting on current affairs. Other specialized magazines also cover several fields (sport, religion, law,...) 
" It's very difficult to know the real circulation of the newspapers : most editors hide the figures that are probably much lower that the ones they claim. 
© Price during the Transition Period 
§ Have survived until now (May 1996) 1. The Democratic Transition in Benin 
In 1988, Benin was a ruined and exhausted country. The state was bankrupt and 
unable to pay the salaries of the too numerous civü servants
4. The economy had 
collapsed: exports, mainly based on cotton and palm oil production, kept diminishing 
and 90% of all commercial transactions consisted of smuggling with neighbouring 
Nigeria (Allen, 1992). The main reasons for that disaster were to be found in 
several factors: the colonial legacy, the drop in prices of raw material and 16 
years of a military marxist-leninist, widely corrupted, regime. 
The media were restricted to one governmental newspaper, a daily called Ehuzu 
(which means "revolution") and one broadcasting national institution, the O.R.T.B. 
(Office de Radio Télévision du Bénin). Those media were only the mouthpieces 
of the government but by 1988, their financial situation was so dramatic that they 
could hardly fulfill that official duty. There was also another newspaper, La Croix 
du Bénin, in the hands of the Catholic Church: it was probably tolerated because 
it was old (it was founded in 1949) and also because it didn't deal directly with 
political current affairs. There was no possibility in Benin for a dissident or critical 
voice to make itself heard, although the clandestine P.CD. (Parti Communiste 
du Dahomey), "bête noire" of the regime, had been fighting in the dark. The 
PCD was editing a small-circulation clandestine paper, La Flamme, devoted to 
its hatred towards the regime of General Mathieu Kérékou: people who were 
found in possession of that newspaper or even just photocopies of it were 
immediately arrested and sent to jail
3. 
Such was the situation when, in March 1988, a private newspaper, La Gazette 
du Golfe, appeared, quickly followed, in June, by another one: Tam-Tam Express. 
At first, those newspapers were probably allowed by the government for two 
main reasons: on the one hand, students and civil servants were starting to 
demonstrate, demanding their scholarships and wages to be paid. Clandestine 
pamphlets against the government were distributed in most main cities. The Kérékou 
4. In Benin, as in many African countries, civil service has always meant privilege as it 
offered regular salaries and other advantages. All graduated students would automatically 
become civil-servants. As a result, the civil service grew from 7.000 jobs in 1972 to 
47.000 in 1989 (Heilbrunn, 1992). 
5. Another group fighting the establishment was the one of the University students. 
Several times (1977, 1985), demonstrations took place on the campus, often ending in 
riots with the police and jail sentences for the leaders of the student movements. 
88 regime probably thought that allowing the publishing of a private newspaper could 
be a means to soothe civil unrest. Newspapers were controlled by a board of 
censors which only allowed publication so they could play the part of the safety 
valve. On the other hand, the existence of a private press was a way of pleasing 
foreign partners whose support was becoming increasingly necessary for the 
Beninese state's survival. 
For one of the two newspapers, there was probably a third motivation. Whereas 
La Gazette du Golfe was mainly devoted to describing social problems and the 
shared misery of the people (without direct criticism of the authorities), Tam-Tam 
Express almost exclusively paid attention to the failures of the banking system. 
The paper made revealed how a few privileged people of the regime reaped huge 
financial profits by transferring money from the Beninese national banks to private 
accounts in Europe (Vittin, 1991). By denouncing the transfers and naming the 
people involved in that nationwide theft, Tam-Tam Express probably helped Kérékou 
to sully the reputation of the collaborators he wanted to get rid of. This newspaper 
was thus probably a means for the regime to sort out its own inner quarrels. 
Nevertheless, these two newspapers, even if they were meant by the country leaders 
to serve as their tools, soon escaped from that control. In fact, the popular unrest 
kept growing (Gbado, 1992). The collapsing of the banking system, soon leading 
to the closure of all private accounts, prevented the civil servants from having 
access to their savings. The absence of salaries thus became a much bigger issue 
and, from January 1989, strikes and demonstrations multiplied. In June, the State 
was forced to sign a Structural Adjustment Agreement with the IMF in order 
to get a rninimal funding to be able to pay a part of the salaries. But the counterpart 
demands of the IMF (staff cuts in the administration, less scholarship grants for 
students) would just make the popular dissent grow. 
Meanwhile, events abroad, especially in Eastern Europe, had helped to change 
the tone of the popular claim. From economics, the demands grew to politics, 
including democracy, multi-partyism, and respect of human rights. Eventually, 
in December, President Kérékou was forced to announce the end of the marxist-
leninist ideology and the separation of the Party (the Parti Populaire de la Révolution 
Béninoise, PRPB) and the State. He also promised to organise a national Conference 
where all "the vivid forces of the nation" would gather and discuss the national 
issues (Ehuzu n°3596). By that time, the "media scenery" had profoundly changed 
in the country. Other private newspapers had appeared, voicing the grievances 
of the people and strongly criticizing the regime, and the official media we restarting 
to broaden their views. On December 11, the national television broadcasted images 
of a demonstration where Kérékou, who had gone down in the street in order 
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TOGO: to calm the unrest, was greeted with stones and insults. Obviously, things were 
changing in Benin... 
- The National Conference in Benin and the Transition period 
The National Conference eventually took place in Cotonou between February 
19th and 28th 1990. 493 delegates chosen from political "groups" (there were 
no political parties yet), trade-unions, belonging to different religious backgrounds, 
professional associations, NGO's, governmental institutions, members of the 
diaspora... gathered during 10 very tense days (Raynal, 1991)
6. Many times, 
the forum was about to fail under the weight of huge disagreements and the constant 
threats of the old PRPB dignitaries wanting to put an end to the Conference. 
But the members eventually reached a consensus which was, very surprisingly, 
accepted by President Kérékou. The Conference decided to elect a new Prime 
Minister which would form and lead a transition government during 12 months. 
During this period, a new Constitution would be written and adopted by referendum, 
economic reforms would start and all the workers would go back to work and 
have their grievances settled. At the end of that transition period, free and fair 
elections would be held in order to designate a new President and a legislative 
body, the National Assembly (Adamon, 1995). 
The National Conference of Benin was an important event, not only for the country 
but probably for French-Speaking West Africa as a whole, where similar grievances 
for more freedom and political participation were voiced, mainly in the capital 
cities (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1993). It was also an important turning-point, a real 
revolution, in the world of the media. The Beninese media actually showed that 
the written press, radio and television could turn their backs to manipulated (suppo-
sedly "development"or "revolutionary") journalism and be the tools needed to 
enforce a democratic process. 
The private press helped to prepare the ground for the National Conference by 
paying much attention to all issues that should be discussed, interviewing political 
opponents, voicing the people's fears and concerns. During the Conference, all 
6. Raynal (1991) shows how these delegates, calling themselves "representatives of the 
nation" actually belonged to very specific groups, mostly urban and intellectual. The 
uneducated peasantry, which is absolutely majoritary in Benin, was completely under-
represented. 
91 debates were broadcasted life by the radio, so that they could be followed even 
in the farthest villages. The television was not allowed to do the same but journalists 
made consistent efforts to overcome that limit and broadcasted images of the Confe-
rence and interviews of the delegates. All the debates were filmed and videotapes 
of the extended meeting were available all over Cotonou. At the end of the 
Conference, a special mention was granted to the journalists "considering that 
the involvement of the national press in its information task had been a powerful 
support and had played a decisive part in the success of the Conference" (Ehuzu). 
The delegates finally insisted on the fact that "the renewal of the media should 
lay the foundations of the Democratic Renewal." (Assevi, 1993) 
The transition period, which lasted until April 1991, was probably the time when 
the Beninese press enjoyed the widest freedom of all its history. The private press 
grew: about fifty different newspapers were created, even if most of them were 
short-lived (L'Opinion, Le Forum de la Semaine, L'Observateur, Le Soleil...). 
They imposed a new conception of journalism with opinions, comments and political 
analysis. That press was free of all taboos and could sharply criticize the former 
regime as well as the government of new Prime Minister Nicéphore Soglo. It 
has played a decisive part during the constitutional referendum (commenting the 
projects, giving advice to the voters) as well as while the parliamentary and 
presidential elections (explaining the rules of the new pluralist political game, 
pointing out the practical problems). The press was at the same time a spectator 
and an actor of the democratic transition, just as it was both a cause and a 
consequence of the process. 
Government-owned media also changed their tune. Ehuzu, the government 
newspaper, changed its name into La Nation ("The Nation"): the marxist-leninist 
revolution was definitely over. Most of its journalists were involved in private 
newspapers where they could earn more money and reveal the writing abilities 
they had been hiding for years behind the traditional political cant. In the ORTB, 
the change was obvious as well. The name of the radio was changed from "The 
Voice of the Revolution" to "Radio Cotonou". The station opened its doors and 
microphones to different political parties and social forces. New shows were created, 
based on public debates and confrontation between people with different opinions. 
The television station went through similar changes, even though they were slower 
and maybe not as deep. 
The attitude of the people towards the media also changed. The private press 
was of course very popular, and the surprise was more on the side of the 
government-owned media. For years, the people had despised the national media 
and turned to international broadcasting (Quenum, 1991). If it was not for the 
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Un supplément de 12 pages réalisé par des journalistes du Burkina Faso du 
Niger, du Togo, de la Guinée, de la Côte d'Ivoire et du Bénin sur le thème : 
"Causes et incidences environnementales des mouvements de 
la population en Afrique Occidentale côtière" obligation for all public places (bars, restaurants, administrations...) to be on 
the national channel "La Voix de la Révolution", there would have been no listeners 
or viewers of the ORTB for more than a decade. But, as "Radio Cotonou" went 
through that dramatic change, the audience came to appreciate it again. During 
the National Conference, transistors sellers ran out of stock as everybody in Cotonou 
was walking around with his radio receiver sticked on his ear. 
The attitude of the new government towards the media was at first totally different 
from the one under the PRPB regime. There was no board of censors commission 
anymore and the newspapers did not have to get a permit before publishing. The 
transition legislative body, the Haut Conseil de la République (HCR) and the 
government became used to meet the press and organise press conferences. 
Nevertheless, this is probably the point where the new problems first arose. Because, 
as the Soglo government came progressively to meet sharp criticism (which was 
unavoidable because the situation of the country was so terrible that all problems 
could not get a quick solution), the executive body tried more and more to influence 
and control the national media (Quenum, 1991). 
- The post-transition period 
At the end of the transition period, in March 1991, Nicéphore Soglo won the 
electoral battle against Mathieu Kérékou and became President of the Republic 
of Benin. If the so-called transition period was over, the country was nevertheless 
still in the process of implementing democracy. Democracy not only means having 
a Constitution and democratic institutions, it also means a "political culture" and 
a general state of mind, among the leaders as well as among the people in general. 
Benin and the Beninese media are thus still going through the transition. 
Most of the private newspapers of the transition period have quickly disappeared. 
The ones that survived (La Gazette du Golfe, Tam-Tam Express, Le Forum de 
la Semaine...) probably succeeded because of the following reasons: most of them 
were in the hands of business men or rich people giving them strong financial 
backing, they all tried since the very beginning to respect the periodicity and 
most of them recruited some good professional journalists, avoiding to rest only 
on the goodwill of amateurs. 
The Beninese private press is facing some important difficulties (lack of financial 
means, low literacy rate among the population) and has let dangerous deviations 
occur (constant "sensationalism" of some media, tendency to corruption). We 
94 will see in the third part of this paper how the problems of the press and those 
of the democratic process itself are related. 
Currently, Benin is at a turning point of its democratic process. On March 18th 
1996, six years after the Beninese National Conference, presidential elections 
were held and won by the former military leader Mathieu Kérékou
7. During 
the electoral campaign, new private newspapers appeared, backing the different 
candidates but they disappeared rapidly after the election. The attitude of the national 
media during the whole process showed how much the Soglo administration had 
succeeded in gradually imposing its control on the radio and the television stations. 
The attitude of the new regime towards the press has so far been respectful. But 
the new press law, that was proposed during the transition period to replace the 
outdated law of 1960, has not yet been presented in front of the National Assembly. 
It seems that President Kérékou is not more in a hurry than was former President 
Soglo to give the private press a new and appropriate legal framework. 
7. Nicéphore Soglo emerged in the lead at the first round with 35,64% of the votes 
followed by Kérékou who won 33,94%. But after most of the other candidates rallied to 
Kérékou, the former military leader became favourite for the second round which he 
ended up winning with 52,49% of the votes. Soglo had lost much popularity because of 
the structural adjustment policy he implemented (leading to a spectacular economic 
recovery but very painful for the many public sector workers) and of his growing 
authoritarianism, nepotism and favoritism. 
95 Niger : Main Newspapers during the Transition Period (November '91-April '93) 
Name  Editor (ownership)  date of 
creation 
periodicity  circulation *  location  size  price 
(Transition) @ 
LeSahel
 s  Ministry of Information 
(State) 
1 974  daily  3500  Niamey  8p  100 FCFA 
Sahel Dimanche
 §  Ministry of information 
(State) 
1985  weekly  4500  Niamey  16p  150 FCFA 
Haské  Ibrahim Cheikh Diop 
(Private) 
May 1990  fortnightly  10000-5000  Niamey  16p  300 FCFA 
Le Républicain
 s  Maman Abou (Private)  June 1991  weekly  5000  Niamey  8p  200 FCFA 
Anfani
 s  Grémah Boucar (Private)  Jan. 1992  monthly then 
forthnightly 
(93) 
3500  Niamey  12p  250 FCFA 
Le Démocrate ^  Bory Seyni (Private)  May 1992  weekly  3000  Niamey  8p  250 FCFA 
Le Paon Africain 
(humoristic) 
Moustapha Diop (Private)  Oct. 1992  weekly  2000  Niamey  4p->8p  150->200 FCFA 
Moustique (humoristic) Inoussa Ousseini 
Others: Kakaki (in Haoussa language), l'Express Nigérien, Horizon 2001 (irregular) 
# The newspapers mentioned are the ones reporting on current affairs. Other specialized magazines also cover several fields (sport, religion, law,...) 
* It's very difficult to know the real circulation of the newspapers : most editors hide the figures that are probably much lower that the ones they claim. 
@ Price during the Transition Period 
§ Have survived until now (May 1996) 2. Democratie Transition in Niger 
Niger, as Benin and many West African countries during the '80s, has lived for 
many years under the rule of a strong military dictatorship. In 1987, after the 
death of the severe President Seyni Kountché, the moderate General Ali Sa'ibou 
came to power, filling Nigériens with hope. The new President started to engage 
the country on the path of political reforms, even though the changes were only 
"limited" and "locked" (Raynal, 1991). The military partially drew back from 
the stage, as a new Constitution established a civil one-party system in 1989. 
But the expectations of the Nigérien people were much higher and unrest started 
on the University campus and among the civil servants. In Niger too the state 
was in an uncomfortable situation: a poor, desertic, landlocked country, Niger 
had survived for years thanks to its uranium production. But the decline of the 
price of uranium on the international market and the widely extended corruption 
among the ruling elite quickly put the country into a difficult position. In 1984, 
Niger started to follow a Structural Adjustment Program but most of the 
requirements of the IMF were quite unpopular, especially among the urban and 
educated middle-class
8. 
The discontent did not have any channel to express their concern as all media 
were government-owned and strictly controlled. The national daily, Le Sahel, 
and the weekly, Le Sahel Dimanche, were under the direction of the Ministry 
of Information. Most of the journalists had defected either to create private 
businesses, either to leave the country for any place where they would be able 
to write freely. There had been a few attempts by those defecting journalists to 
set up independent newspapers, dealing with economics (£,'Opérateur Economique), 
sports (Promo-Sport) or religion (the islamic review IQRA), but none of them 
lasted long and none of them wrote about political or social problems. Besides, 
the national broadcasting institution, l'O.R.T.N. (Office National de Radio 
Télévision du Niger), including the radio station "La Voix du Sahel" and a new 
television station operating only since 1988, was merely the official mouthpiece 
of the political leaders and a tool for propaganda. 
There were no reports in those official media about the demonstrations and strikes 
shaking the Nigérien regime and growing constantly. Even more so when two 
tragic incidents intensified the popular claim for democracy and provoked 
8. For years, in Niger as in Benin, it had been established that all students who graduated 
would automatically find a job in the civil service. That's why the IMF requirement of 
reducing the number of civil servants was ill accepted by both students and civil servants. 
97 international disapproval. On February 9th 1990, a few days before the opening 
of the National Conference in Benin, the police charged at a group of unarmed 
students peacefully demonstrating, killing three and injuring more than sixty
9. 
In La Gazette du Golfe in Cotonou, the headlines of the Nigérien correspondant 
read: "In Niger like in China: Police Shoots Students"
10. The second tragedy 
took place in the north of the country where, in May, the army massacred about 
70 members of the Tuareg community, wounding about a hundred others
11. 
Condemned by the international community, harrassed by inner grievances, the 
Nigérien regime had to reconsider its "limited and locked democratic opening". 
It did not have much choice, in front of the demands of the Bretton Woods 
Institution now imposing "political conditionnality" and the French decision 
(announced at the La Baule Summit in June 90) to link aid with the progress of 
democracy. Niger needed foreign money too much to allow itself to go against 
the donators'will. Slowly but inexorably, the government was forced into making 
concessions. 
In May, a first private newspaper was allowed, Haské (which means "light"), 
which started immediately to voice popular claims. It was the first private political 
paper in Niger for 31 years, as freedom of the press had been stifled even before 
the country reached Independence. The Nigérien people were enthusiastic and 
captivated by that new astonishing style and content. The circulation rapidly grew 
to 15.000 copies which is enormous for a country where hardly 10% of the 
population can read French and where a newspaper costs more than a meal. 
In November, multi-partyism was officially allowed and in December a National 
Conference was announced to be scheduled for May 91. For more than 7 months, 
the country lived in the expectation of the Conference (the administration and 
schooling system were paralysed) and in the awaiting of Haské editions. It remained 
the only private newspaper in the country for a whole year. The national daily 
Le Sahel, meeting huge financial problems, tried to survive but had to interrupt 
its publication from December 1989 to April 1991 and from June 1991 to February 
1993. Le Sahel-Dimanche at least kept corning out regularly. 
9. The Student Union talked about 10 people killed. The high number of victims is due to 
the fact that the students were on the narrow bridge crossing the Niger river when the 
police started to shoot. Running away was almost impossible. 
10. La Gazetten du Golfe n°43, February 16th-28th 1990. 
11. Here again, the official toll is contested by international humanitarian organisations 
(estimating the deaths to 400), and the local Tuareg people (talking about one thousand). 
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Hebdomadaire Nigérien d'Information et de Réflexion 
HASKE N° 48 DU 9 DECEMBRE 1992 - PRDC NIGER : 300 F CFA - CEDEAO : 3S0 F CFA - FRANCE : 14 FF 
•PI 
ARGUMENT DE...CHOIX ! 
U
n économiste ghanéen 
disait tout récemment 
(voir Haské n°46 p.8) 
que tes "Africains ont commis 
une erreur de raisonnement 
monumentale. Us ont pensé 
que les colonialistes étaient des 
capitalistes. Le colonialisme 
étant détestable, Us en ont dé-
duit que le capitalisme l'était 
également". 
De la même manière, on a la 
nette impression aujourd'hui 
que devant la faillite de la 
transition, certaines personnes 
sont entrain de penser que 
puisque celte transition était 
l'expression d'un processus 
démocratique, ta démocratie 
n'est tout simplement pas 
bonne pour le Niger. 
C'est avec untel raisonnement 
que l'on s'apprête à nous 
vendre l'image du Sauveur 
autoritaire ! 
Cela n'est guerre étonnant car 
de Platon à nos jours, en pas-
sant par Mussolini et Hitler, 
on sait que plus un slogan 
politique est simple et bête, 
plus il mord dans l'opinion. 
Le niveau d'éducation n'a rien 
à voir dans l'affaire. Il se 
trouve tout simplement que 
l'homme a une tendance 
naturelle à la paresse : moins 
on sollicite sa réflexion, plus 
vite il réagit. Surtout lorsque 
cette propagande, comme on 
peut le constater ici au Niger, 
se fait sur fond d'éthnicisme. 
Un régime démocratique n'a 
certainement'rien à voir avec 
un régime autoritaire. Et si 
nous connaissons bien le 
premier pour l'avoir subi pen-
dant 15 ans, nous sommes en-
core loin d'avoir assimilé les 
principes du second. Ce qui 
fait que dans la réalité, le choix 
que l'on nous offre se resume 
à ceci : 
- le retour, avec des hommes 
du passé, à un système dont 
nous subissons encore au-
jourd'hui les inepties. 
• l'aventure palpitante d'une 
nouvelle vie qui a fait ses 
preuves ailleurs. 
Faut-il encore hésiter ? 
IBRICHECK I 
Le journal HASKE vient d'être condamné par le tribunal de Première Instance de Niamey 
à une peine de trois mois de prison avec sursis et 350 000 F CFA d'amende pour avoir 
diffamé Monsieur Souley Dan Gara dit Balla Dan Sani, opérateur économique de son 
état. L'acte de diffamation porte sur la publication par le journal Indépendant de la liste 
des opérateurs économiques qui, du fait de l'octroi abusif pendant la période d'exception, 
de licences d'importation d'essence - et cela au détriment de la Société Nigérienne de 
Produits Pétroliers (SONTDEP) - qui ont occasionné un manque à gagner de plus de 6. 
(six) milliards de francs CFA à ladite société d'Etat. 
Nous avons évidemment fait appel contre ce verdict qui a tout l'air d'un véritable scandale 
juridique. Car non seulement il n'y a pas eu, à proprement dire» diffamation, mais aussi 
parce que les arguments'utilisés démontrent qu'on a eu droit à une véritable parodie de 
procès dont le verdict était connu d'avance : intimider HASKE coûte que coûte pour faire 
peur à toute la presse indépendante. 
Décidément, les pratiques d'an tan ont la vie dure ! 
gVotre enquêté en page 4) [ 
LES VAGUES DE L'ACTE 21 
Comme prévu, la tentative de suppression a soulevé un tollé- Non sans 
quelques raisons... j r».-* 
SOC3ETE-'~:&ïrA
:-.' <~^T TT/rTTRE ; 1">T T.-fTHE^ 
Au Burkina, au Mali, au Niger, plus qu'une distraction, la consommation du.thé 
est devenue une véritable culture. i " urep.6 
RTRAlVGERi L'INTERVENTION AMERICAINE EN SOMALIE<p® g - The National Conference and the Transition period in Niger 
The National Conference of Niger started on July 29th 1991, after having been 
postponed twice for financial and practical reasons (Abdourahmane, 1992). The 
forum gathered almost one thousand delegates, lasted for 98 days and costed 400 
million CFA francs (80 million French Francs = 16 million US.$). A lot of money 
and a lot of time for little results! (Raynal, 1991) The Conference degenerated 
almost from the very beginning into a huge "catharsis" where everybody wanted 
to express his personal resentment against the former regime or against particular 
individuals. "The Conference of all hopes has become the Conference of all 
dangers", wrote Haské, adding that the forum was now like "a fighting ring or 
a battlefield"
12. Some very harmful and extremist words were pronounced and 
the Conference spent much more time dwelling on the past than thinking of the 
future. When the debates ended on November 5th, most of the delegates were 
tired and disappointed. And most of the ordinary people had quit listening to 
the radio life broadcasting, disgusted by the permanent fightings and repetitions. 
Although the idea of the National Conference had been copied from the Beninese 
example, the copy did not match the model. And the other African countries which 
tried to follow that path did not do any better
13. 
The institutions of the democratic transition were also copied from the Beninese 
ones but here again, the new government accumulated mistakes and was globally 
unable to run the country and its catastrophic economic and social situation. On 
the economic level, the delegates of the students and civil servants at the Conference 
had refused to continue the S. A.P. any further and the country found itself without 
any funding from foreign institutions. The social unrest never stopped and grew 
even worse as the wages and scholarships could not be paid
14. In the north of 
the country, the Tuareg community, tired of being the eternal left-outs of Niger 
and disappointed with the results of a National Conference where their grievances 
12. Haské n°18, August 26th - September 2nd 1991. 
13. National Conferences took place in several countries of French-speaking Africa 
(Congo, Gabon, Togo, Chad, Zaïre...). None of them can be regarded as successful. (See 
Eboussi-Boulaga, 1993) 
14. In June 1990, the transition government, paralysed by the lack of finance, announced 
the official recognition of the State of Taiwan (until then, Niger had diplomatic relations 
with Popular Republic of China). In return, Taïwan had supposedly promised $50 million 
of aid for the country over the following 5 years. The first donations helped to pay the 
wages and scholarships, but a large part of the money had to be devoted to maintain some 
development projects that were until then financed by Popular China, as China broke off 
relations as soon as Taïwan was recognized. 
100 had not been heard, put their last forces into a guerrilla movement that soon set 
the whole northern region in fire
15. 
On the political level, quarrels immediately started between the new Prime Minister 
of the transition government, Amadou Cheiffou, and the head of the new legislative 
body, André Salifou. It soon appeared that for nearly all the politicians, personal 
interest was coming before national interest (Kotoudi ,1993). Among the military, 
there was a lot of resentment as the army had been rejected from the political 
stage and had therefore lost its numerous privileges. Two mutinies occurred, 
each time directly threatening the democratic process. In August, the troops arrested 
some 200 important Tuaregs, without having received any order to do so. They 
kept these civilians in prison until February 1992 and the transition government 
didn't make any effort to put an end to this illegal situation
16. 
That chaotic transition period was also the time when islamic fundamentalists 
started violent riots in Eastern Niger and when clashes between nomadic shepherds 
and sedentary farmers caused dozens of deaths. Eventually, when the transition 
period came to an end in Niger, everybody felt releaved. "The end at last! That 
transition seemed endless... and even the most patient ones ended up being 
discouraged"
17, wrote the newspaper Haské for which the transition had been 
"a long walk through the desert guided by ruthlessly ambitious politicians"
18. 
The democratic polls were probably the major successes of the transition period. 
The new Constitution was adopted through referendum in December 92, and the 
parliamentary and presidential elections took place in February and March 1993. 
15. The Tuaregs are a people of nomadic shepherds living in the Sahel and Sahara. They 
have always been left out, even rejected, by the Nigérien state. In 1973 and 1984, two 
severe droughts killed most of the flocks, reducing the Tuareg people to extreme poverty 
and forcing them to settle down in villages. Most of the foreign aid that was supposed to 
support the Tuaregs through that catastrophe was embezzled by political executives, 
creating a lot of frustration among the population. 
16. The situation was not only illegal but also absurd as, among the prisoners, there were 
many officials and even one Minister, member of the transition government. A governe-
ment that has just ignored the fact that a minister was missing... until the day he was 
released! 
17. Haské, Special issue, February 12th 1993. 
18. Haské, n°60, March 19th 1993. 
101 Mahamane Ousmane became the first democratically elected President in the history 
of Niger
19. 
Another positive and durable change in the Nigérien transition period is to be 
found among the media. During that period, private newspapers multiplied: just 
before the National Conference, Le Républicain had joined Haské in his fight 
for democratic changes. Then Anfani, Le Démocrate, Le Paon Africain, Moustique... 
appeared. There were not as many newspapers in Niger as in Benin during the 
similar period. Several reasons stand for that: firstly, Niger is a landlocked country 
where it is very difficult to find all the equipment and raw materials necessary 
to produce a newspaper ; this puts the cost of the newspaper production very 
high. Secondly, Niger is a poor Sahelian country where most people can not afford 
buying the paper, especially if it is comparatively expensive. Thirdly, for historical 
reasons mainly going back to colonisation, the literacy rate is lower in Niger 
that it is in Benin (12% for 25%). 
But even if they have a relatively small circulation, the Nigérien newspapers still 
played a part in the democratic transition. They initiated a new type of journalism 
that had never been practised in that country before. They probably influenced 
the journalists working in government media which opened up progressively. 
There was an obvious change in the way "La Voix du Sahel" and "Télé-Sahel" 
handled reporting during the National Conference and along the transition period. 
The media broadcasted interviews and debates with the different political parties 
and trade-unions, reflecting the emerging pluralism. During the transition period 
the source of authority and power is not unique anymore, but plural and less clearly 
defined. The national media were not fearful because they did not really know 
who and what they should fear. They were freed from their constant submission 
as they did not know exactly who was (nor who would later be) in charge of 
public affairs. And that is why, in Niger also, when a new President was elected, 
things changed: attempts from the government to control state-owned media revived 
and the journalists felt again the weight of the authority to which they belonged. 
19. He was also the first president belonging to the Haussa ethnic group which is 
majoritary (55%) in Niger. Since colonisation time, the political structure, the army and 
most of the civil service had been dominated by the Zarma (22%). The victory of 
Mahamane Ousmane thus also meant "ethnic change" at the top of the country. 
102 - The post-transition period 
If the democratic transition period in Niger can be judged as a failure, the worse 
was yet to come. The new democratically elected President, Mahamane Ousmane, 
rapidly showed authoritarian tendencies and quarrelled with the political parties 
from his coalition first, then with the National Assembly and eventually with 
his Prime Minister who resigned in October 1994. For months, the State apparatus 
was paralysed until the Assembly was dissolved and anticipated legislative elections 
were held in January 1995. The former State-Party, the MNSD, won the election 
and imposed to Mahamane Ousmane a Prime Minister of its choice, Hama Amadou. 
The State remained paralysed for one year as the President and the Prime Minister 
refused very quickly to collaborate. Eventually, on January 29th 1996, a military 
junta made a coup bringing the General Ibrahim Bare Maïnassara to power. It 
was the first coup d'etat in French-speaking Africa since the démocratisation process 
began in 1990. 
Although he first said he would give back the power to civilians, Bare Maïnassara 
decided to be candidate for the presidential election held on July 7th and 8th 1996. 
He won at the first round but the election was contested by civilian democratic 
forces
2
0 (political parties, labour unions and some private newspapers) accusing 
Bare Maïnassara of having stagged an "electoral coup d'état"
21. After the January 
coup, Baré's attitude towards the press was harsh as he tried to establish censorship 
and intimidated the editors and journalists. It didn't prevent some newspapers 
from criticizing very sharply the newly elected President. The future of the private 
press, as the one of the whole country, remains until now very uncertain. 
20. The presidential election ended in confusion : the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (CENI) was disbanded on July 8th, three hours before the closure of the 
polling. The security forces collected a certain number of ballot boxes and records. The 
homes of the candidates were placed under surveillance (Africa Research Bulletin, vol.33, 
n°7, July lst-31st 1996, p. 12337-12338). The election was also condemned by foreign 
nations including the United States that suspended its economic and military aid program-
me to Niger "in reaction to the obvious adandonment of democracy". 
21. Alternative, n°81, August 23rd 1996. 
103 EDITORIAL 
A
près notre confrère 
«HASKE», void Le Ré-
publicain, hebdoma-
daire d'information et de ré-
flexion. Il se veut avant tout 
une contribution à ta consoli-
dation de la démocratie, des 
libertés et du droit sans les-
quels tout jalon vers le pro-
grès n'est qu'illusoire. Nous 
en voulons pour preuve la si-
tuation économique et so-
ciale désastreuse que nous 
vivons. 
Le Républicain n'est 
/'émanât/on d'aucun parti, 
politique ni d'aucun groupe 
de pression, mais entend uti-
liser tout l'espace des liber-
tés que les textes en vigueur 
lui octroient. Le journal se 
propose d'être une tribune; 
ouverte à tous ceux qui ont 
une thèse fondamentale à, 
énoncer. L'homme ne se' 
nourrissant pas que du pain, 
les besoins d'échanger, de 
penser, d'écrire sant aussi vi-
taux. Les sociétés qui l'ont' 
compris en tirent aujourd'hui 
les fruits. 
Albert Camus disait en 
parlant de la presse: 
«quand la presse est libre, 
cela peut être bon ou mau-
vais mais, assurément, sans 
la liberté, la presse ne peut 
être que mauvaise. Pour ta' 
presse comme P
our| 
/'nomme, la liberté n offre 
aucune cfiqnce d'être meil-
leur, la servitude n'est que la 
certitudp de devenir pire.» 
Cela dit, la situation ac-
tuelle ne satisfait ni la presse, 
pile lecteur. Le citoyen qui ne 
voit rien venir, lui, se àecou-
rage.Puisse Le Républicain 
contribuer au rayonnement 
de l'information, en tout cas 
ta plus objective sur l'actua-
lité nationale et internqt'io-
'nale. 
Maman Abou 
0>?^\ TRAVAUX DE LA CNPCN 
L'INCERTITUDE PLANE SUR LA CONFERENCE NATIONALE 
esT-ce fut TU pants A 
La controverse est en train d'ébran-
ler le consensus qui devait mener à 
la Conférence nationale. Le rejet des 
'travaux préparatoires par plusieurs 
associations, notamment la chefferie 
traditionnelle et l'UNC, bisse encore 
planer l'incertitude sur sa tenue le 15 
juillet prochain. C'est une sommation 
qui a été adressée à la CNPCN, par-
tant, à l'Opposition, quand on sait que 
les contestataires sont considérés 
pro-gouvemementaux. De là à dire 
que l'action a été commanditée par le 
Pouvoir et son parti, îl n'y a qu'un pas 
que l'opinion publique a vite franchi. 
Diverses raisons peuvent être avan-
cées pour expliquer cette manœuvre. 
Les représentants du Pouvoir aux 
préparatifs de la Conférence nationale 
ont approuvé en même temps que 
l'Opposition, le document final des 
travaux. On voit mal le Pouvoir dé-
noncer aussitôt ce texte par une voix 
officielle, il serait absurde qu'il prenne 
l'initiative d'un affrontement direct 
avec l'Opposition. Une telle stratégie 
ne lui a d'ailleurs jamais réussi. D'où 
le recours aux associations «appa-
rentées». ' . • 
Les populations rurales qui sont au 
centre de Id controverse constituent 
un véritable enjeu. Ce monde repré-
sente effectivement la majorité de la 
(Suii«
Jpog«2) 
^OMMAIRE-
crimes POLITIQUES ET ECONOMIQUES 
• Plus de 100 affaires retenues Lire page 3 
: CODE DE LA FAMILLE 
• A quand le bout du tunnel ?  Page 5 
" AFFAIRES DU 9 FEVRIER 1990 ; 
• ' Dédommagement d'une victime Page 6 3. Media and Democratic Transition 
The description of the democratic experiments in Benin and Niger shows that 
there is no such thing as a "democratic transition model" which would be valid 
everywhere and for every country. The National Conference, viewed as a "Beninese 
invention" had poor results when it was transplanted in the neighbouring countries. 
Nevertheless, if there is no institutional model, there are some main factors that 
can be regarded as necessary for the implementation of democracy. Most of the 
political scientists writing on democratic processes acknowledge the fact that the 
emergence of a private press, freely voicing the opinion of different people or 
groups of people is "an important priority" for complete and durable democratization 
of any society (Diamond, Linz, Lipset, 1990). In Niger as in Benin that priority 
has probably been fulfilled, although partially. We will now give a closer look 
to that new, private, written press and its role during the democratic transition. 
- The different roles of the private press 
The role of the journalist completely changed as the new private press emerged 
during the process of democratization in French-speaking West Africa. The 
journalist is not a tool in the hands of the rulers anymore, serving as their 
mouthpiece: he has become an independent actor on the political stage. The new 
private press is now a critical observer of the political field at the same time as 
a watchdog for the good of the democratic transition. In that sense, it can be 
said that it acts as "opposition forces" in order to control the people in power. 
One of the favourite subjects of the papers during the transition was the denunciation 
of all abuses committed by the former (and sometimes the new) government. 
As the editor of a Nigérien paper said: "The press might not be strong enough 
to prevent our leaders from making personal profit or breaking the law, but at 
least it is dissuasive. They know that if they do so, the whole country will be 
aware of it. And all depends then on the capacity of the civilians to take action 
about it once they know. That is beyond the ability of the press."
2
2 
The involvement of the press in the political field is also obvious during the several 
votes. During the presidential election in Benin, almost all newspapers overtly 
called the people to vote for Nicéphore Soglo. La Gazette du Golfe wrote that 
22. Bori Seyni, Le Démocrate (Interview, Niamey, May 1994). 
105 people should obviously give their favour to Soglo asking whether there is "anyone 
who would prefer slavery to liberty"
23. In Niger where the private press was 
split between supporters of the candidate of the former "parti unique" and the 
one of the "forces for change", the latter for example wrote: "The victory of 
Ousmane is the victory of democracy" (Jlaské)
24 and "Le Paon incites you to 
vote for Mahamane Ousmane"
25. In both countries, the new private press stated 
their opinion clearly on the main political issues during the transition period. 
In that sense too, it claimed to be an actor of the democratic process. 
Nevertheless, regarding the role of the private press in democratic transitions 
in West Africa, one may notice that the new private press can also often be a 
means to legitimate the people in power. It is a visible, concrete sign of freedom 
that often serves as a "democratic façade" for regimes willing to please foreign 
standards of good governance. That was the case in Benin and Niger before the 
National Conferences, and it was obvious in countries like Ivory Coast or Mauritania 
where freedom of the press was granted but there was obviously no will on the 
part of the leaders to give a chance to political alternance. At this point, the press 
plays an ambiguous part: for while it criticizes the government, denounces abuses 
or claims for deeper reforms, the free press is the best tool for the government 
to show that democracy is effective in the country and to avoid external pression 
for even deeper changes. 
- A linguistic renewal 
The difference between the new private press and the former official newspapers 
is not only one of the place occupied or not, active or not on the political field 
; it is also a question of language. The discourse and the tone of the journalists 
have completely changed. Before the democratic transition, the Beninese and 
Nigérien press wrote in a very rigid, ceremonious style and the press was supporting 
an official ideology always presented as the universal Truth (be it marxism-leninism 
in Kérékou's Benin or the Nigérien concept of "Development Society" invented 
by late President Seyni Kountché). The new private press definitely turns its back 
to that conception. 
23. La Gazette du Golfe n°69, March 16th-31st 1991. 
24. Haské n°61, March 19th 1993. 
25. Le Paon Africain, n°20, March 9th 1993. 
106 Firstly, it is obvious now that there is no such thing as a "universal" or "national" 
Truth, but a variety of personal beliefs and opinions. And the opinion of the person 
who happens to be the President of the country is not worth more than anyone 
else's belief. It can therefore be criticized or contradicted. 
Secondly, new concepts appear constantly in the press and are often discussed 
by the journalists or in the readers column: "democracy", "multiparty-system", 
"freedom of speech", "human rights", "elected representative"... Both Beninese 
and Nigérien newspapers discuss the following issues openly: What are the minimal 
conditions for a regime to be called "democracy" ? What is the best electoral 
system ? Should there be limitations to freedom of speech ? Should the number 
of political parties be limited ? When does a people have the right to rebel against 
its elected leaders ? 
Thirdly, the new private press expresses its convictions and opinions in a totally 
"renovated" or "liberated" language. Irony, slang, insults, metaphors, scorn have 
become usual in these newspapers where caricatures are most common. In Benin, 
Kérékou is referred to as the "Chameleon"
26, Soglo was called "Father Christmas" 
as he was distributing food and presents to the peasants during his electoral 
campaign. Mahamane Ousmane's nickname in Niger soon became "Emperor 
Nafarko"
2
7 and former President Ali Saïbou was a "Sweet Granddad". That 
"verbal creativity" deeply renews the political discourse people are used to in 
West Africa
28. 
Those new language practices also destroy the sacred aura usually surrounding 
the political leaders. Irony towards the "Big Men" existed before but was hidden: 
26. That nickname couldn't be more appropriate than now : Mathieu Kérékou, the symbol 
of 17 years of military marxist-leninist dictatorship in Benin has just been elected 
President in March 1996, after free and fair elections. The incumbent President Nicép-
hore Soglo has not yet overcome his defeat. 
27. "Nafarko" means "first" in Haussa language. That nickname was given to President 
Ousmane because he was constantly referring proudly to himself as "the first President 
democratically elected in the history of Niger". (The Haussa ethnic group is majoritory in 
Niger and in many places like the capital-city Niamey, Haussa is the vernacular langua-
ge.) 
28. Research on the African press also show that some features specific to oral tradition 
(such as redundancy, imagery, aggregative rather than analytic thinking...) appear in that 
press (Bourgault, 1995). 
107 for example in double-faced popular songs (Toulabor, 1991)
2
9 or in clandestine 
papers (La Flamme in Benin). It was also carried by "radio-trottoir" (for which 
the closest English translation could be "bush telegraph"). All that informal political 
information is now openly written or shouted publically, in a sometimes excessive 
manner. Indeed, many newspapers have happened to fall from irony to insult, 
from criticism to defamation. It is probably unavoidable when freedom of speech 
comes back to the ones that have been deprived from it for decades
30. 
History also shows that political revolutions are often going hand in hand with 
"linguistic revolutions". Research on the French Revolution have shown that the 
1789 events were not only important on a political ground, but also constituted 
a "language experiment". More than a hundred newspapers appeared in Paris 
in a few months, defending new political ideas and concepts, experiencing a real 
"explosion of free speech" (Labrosse and Retat, 1989)
31. The "democratic 
revolution" in West Africa probably could not come without a "political language 
revolution". 
- The limited impact of the press 
The democratic transition has thus brought (and at the same time was built on) 
a new conception of journalistic practise, new roles for the press and a new type 
of political language. Nevertheless, the press encounters important limitations, 
restricting its audience enormously and thus its impact. 
The first limit is due to language. All the private newspapers in Benin and Niger 
are published in French. In both countries, French remained the official language 
29. This author shows how, in Togo, some popular songs were actually hiding strong 
criticism against President Eyadema's regime. 
30. In two years (1991-1992), there has been not less than 50 trials for defamation or 
libel in Benin, most of them involving the new private press were lost by the newspapers. 
31. Of course, this type of comparison between African democratic transition and the 
French Revolution can only be limited, as the historical, social, economical and political 
contexts are profoundly different. Nevertheless, it's important to mention that comparison 
was made by the new private press itself in Benin as well as in Niger. We should 
remember that the editors of most of these newspapers started school either under colonial 
rule, either just after Independence, when school programs were still directly copied from 
France and the French Revolution, the Enlightment, the Declaration of Human Rights 
were of course part of the syllabus. 
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countries are multilingual and the choice of one of the local tongues as official 
language would have been considered as the affirmation of the supremacy of that 
particular ethnic group. But the literacy rates are very low (about 12% in Niger 
and 25% in Benin) which is a big restriction for the written press
32. 
A second limit is financial: most people cannot afford to buy a newspaper regularly. 
Each paper that is sold passes from hand to hand and is probably read by ten 
people or more, but the publisher only gets the money once. Some of the youngsters 
selling the newspapers on the streets also "rent" the copies to customers: for 20 
or 50 CFA Francs, you can borrow the paper you wish for half an hour. Therefore, 
most of the newspapers have a very low circulation. During the transition period, 
especially around National Conferences, peaks were reached with circulations 
going up to 20.000 in Benin and 15.000 in Niger, but it soon went down to 5.000 
or 3.000. Many newspapers were then pushed toward sensational reporting in 
order to gain readers and the new private press filled itself with rumours and 
gossips
33. That led to an increasing number of defamation trials and the press 
lost a lot of its credibility. The difficult financial situation also led the editors 
and the ill-paid journalists to accept the financial backing of political parties or 
leaders, bringing the new press to much biased and unfair reporting sometimes 
close to propaganda. Many readers turned their backs to the press because of 
this type of behaviour. 
Geography puts a third limit to the impact of the written press. All newspapers 
in both countries are published in the capital city and hardly go beyond. Especially 
in Niger which is a huge country where transportation is difficult: the newspapers 
cannot be sent in more than six or seven main towns and usually reach them many 
days late. In Niamey as in Cotonou, the editors are also reluctant to send too 
many copies out of the capital: firstly because one has to go every week to the 
bus station, try to find a driver ready to take the copies and bargain for the trans-
32. Illiteracy is no obstacle for radio. But in Niger and in Benin there is as yet no private 
radio station able to reach the huge majority of illiterate peasants. In Niamey (Niger), two 
private stations were created (R&M and Radio Anfani), both of them on MF and mostly 
musical. In Benin, it's only in December 1995 that a first private radio station (Golfe 
Radio) was allowed to run trials in Cotonou. Meanwhile, two international French-
speaking stations, Radio France Internationale and Africa n°l, were allowed to start 
broadcasting in both countries. It's obvious that in Benin, as in Niger, the radio field is 
the one the new leaders want absolute control on. 
33. Revelations about the private life of politicians, news items about sorcery and magic, 
found more and more space in the newspapers. But the "extraordinary" headlines seldom 
matched with the content of the paper with usually very insignificant information. 
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they will never get the money of the sales. The people playing newsagents do 
not bother to send back the profits of the sales, which is also difficult as there 
is hardly any banking system out of the capital city. 
A fourth limit is to be found in the strong integration of the newspapers in the 
political field. In fact, journalists and political activists belong to the same com-
munity: the French-speaking urban elite, mostly composed of teachers, civil-servants 
and students. We have explained in the first part of this paper how that part of 
the population had been the one claiming for democratic changes, the one attending 
the National Conference and the one involved in setting up new political parties. 
Journalists and political activists belong to the same new (more or less, or not 
at all) ruling class : they have many common points, common interest and common 
aims
34. That is partly why most of the reports concern political current events. 
The private press is often a matter of an elite writing for an elite on what the 
same elite is doing. The problems met by peasants and poor suburban people 
(80 to 85% of the population) are quickly reviewed or ignored by the newspapers. 
In Niger for example, there was a severe drought during the transition and about 
2.000 villages were threatened by starvation: none of the newspapers made extensive 
reports on that tragic situation and some of them did not even mention it. 
From those four limits, we can conclude that even if the press is free, it is not 
the spot of national reconciliation: it is still monopolised by a minority and it 
excludes the majority. 
- The limited extension of Democracy 
We have mentioned four limits met by the new private press in the democratic 
transition in Benin and Niger. In fact, it seems that the same factors also limit 
the democratic implementation itself. 
There is a "geographical" limit to the new-born Nigérien and Beninese democracies 
as peasants from the countryside, who are largely dominant, seem to be left out 
of the process. The early demonstrations, the National Conferences (where peasantry 
34. And, in fact, many newspapers are more or less financed by political parties. In a 
way, it's unavoidable, given the difficult financial situation : advertisement hardly exists 
while the political parties are always ready to pay for a paper to flatter them. It's also due 
to the fact that journalists belong to the same social class as the political elite. 
110 was under-represented
35), the transition and the new democratic institutions were 
and still are more meaningful for the urban elites than for the rural or suburban 
population. About the composition of the new Beninese National Assembly, the 
Beninese newspaper Le Forum de la Semaine notices: "Professors and senior 
executives occupy 52 seats out of 64. If you add the lawyers, they reach 57 seats. 
(...) Notably absent from the Assembly are the peasants. There are no peasants 
at all. (...) And on the 64 deputies, 44 actually live in Cotonou and 7 in Porto-
Novo
36. Beninese deputies are thus part of the urban elite."
3
7 
Rural people are often viewed as "second class" citizens and no one cares about 
their political opinion. The old and new politicians just bother to go back to the 
village during electoral campaigns to distribute money and presents in order to 
gain votes. They make many promises, then go back to the city and forget all 
about them. And the figures from the polls show that "anyway, the rural people 
always vote for "the son of the village".
3
8 "(Syfia, 1995) The political parties 
tend therefore to use regionalistic, ethnic, if not tribal propaganda to gain supporters 
and do not care about setting up real programs. In Niger, Anfani denounced the 
"abusive use of ethnicity, regionalism, and even Islam to serve political aims 
during the electoral campaigns."
3
9 And in Benin, Tam-Tam Express fears that 
multi-partyism is about to "awaken the old devils of regionalism which threaten 
the national unity dangerously."
4
0 
There is also a "financial" limitation to the democratic process. There has been 
much debate about the relation between the wealth of a country and its tendency 
35. In both countries, there was much discussion and argument about the quota of 
delegates from each association. There has been a conscious attempt on the part of the 
urban educated elite to limit the number of peasant participants as these were considered 
as "traditional" and "conservative", that is to say in favour of the old regime. 
36. Cotonou is the economic capital but Porto-Novo remains the administrative capital 
city. Both are on the coast (Southern Benin) and only 40 km apart. 
37. Le Forum de la Semaine n°52, April 10th-16th 1991.. 
38. The results of the 1993 elections in Niger show very strong "ethnic" solidarity. It's 
particularly obvious as the democratic "proportional" system has brought an ethnic change 
at the top of the state apparatus. In Benin, at the 1991 presidential election, the four top 
candidates had obviously gathered votes in their region of origin : Kérékou in the North, 
Soglo in the Zou, Tevoedjre in the Ouémé and Amoussou in the Mono. 
39. Anfani n°14, February 16th-28th 1993. 
40. Tam-Tam Express n°60, March 18th-31st 1991. 
Ill to democracy, about the link between development and political pluralism and 
we will not discuss that issue again
41. But it is obvious that democracy cannot 
be easily implemented in countries where people are only anxious about daily 
survival. In addition, new-born democracies in Benin and Niger develop in 
surroundings where, for many years, the state and its apparatus has been the best 
tool for quick and easy personal enrichment. That has been referred to by the 
French political analyst Bayait as "the politics of the belly" (Bayart, 1989): as 
soon as one has managed to reach a post in the administration, one just "eats" 
as much as one can. This concept is completed by Médard's "neo-patrimonialism" 
which qualifies the way African political leaders have always taken the national 
public property as their personal belongings (Médard,1991). These habits did 
not disappear with the democratic transition as the rise of political pluralism in 
those poor and under-developed countries has awakened new ambitions and new 
opportunities for career and enrichment. "Many have already found how to use 
"democracy" to make profits", notices the Beninese newspaper Tam-Tam Express®. 
And, in Niger, Le Démocrate writes: "The elites that were excluded from the 
old privileged system (...) are now using democracy in order to get their share 
of the national cake."
4
3 
The problem of the language can be enlarged to the problem of "culture" in general 
and specifically "political culture". One can define the "political culture" as the 
particular filter through which the people look at, perceive and interpret relations 
of domination, political acts and facts (Martin, 1991). With the democratic 
transition, we have mentioned that new concepts appeared as well as new 
institutions. Nevertheless, it is not just because new institutions such as parliament, 
political parties and free press are set up that the general political culture changes. 
For democracy to take root in a country, there should be a basic commitment 
to democratic principles and ideals. And so far, it is not sure that such a 
commitment does exist, neither among the rural and suburban population that's 
left out of the process, neither among the leaders. 
Le Forum de la Semaine writes: "80% of the Beninese people do not understand 
the scholarly explanations they are given about democracy. They are anxiously 
wondering what those intellectuals are preparing for them now that their marxist-
41. For contrasted recent analysis, see Ake (1996) and Kabou (1992). 
42. Tam-Tam Express n°50, October 20th-November 2nd 1990. 
43. Le Démocrate, n°31, December 21st 1992. 
112 revolution is over."
4
4 The democratic renewal in Niger and Benin brought 
Constitutions and institutions that were copied from the French ones. They therefore 
ignore some of the fundamental principles that remain relevant to the local 
population. The Nigérien newspaper Haskê writes: "That type of democracy that 
is settling in Africa is far from satisfying the ideals of African populations."
4
5 
And in Benin L'Opinion writes: "We should build our political structure on the 
basis of our own experiments. "
4
6 Therefore, a Beninese or Nigérien "democratic 
culture" should not deny some factors that are deeply rooted in the mentality: 
factors like ethnic or regional belonging, religion and witchcraft, specific ways 
of gathering and redistributing the wealth... are the ones to which the majority 
of the people relate, including the leaders (Copans, 1992). 
But how could such an endogenous democratic culture be built ? It does not seem 
that the political elite is ready to work on that point and to help implement demo-
cratic principles in the countryside by adjusting "French" values to traditional 
ones. In fact, as we have mentioned, the commitment of the ruling elite to demo-
cratic principles is not at all certain. Of course the French-speaking Western-
educated elite is able to manipulate the "democratic vocabulary" and thus occupy 
the democratic institutions, but some of their behaviour seems to be totally opposed 
to democratic principles. Some politicians do not hesitate to revive ethnic hatred. 
Many of them tried to corrupt the electorate. And corruption and "politics of 
the belly" is far from having disappeared. 
Could the newspapers help to build a new "democratic culture" ? Maybe. As 
we have seen above, the private press is the first to notice all the failures and 
manipulations of the rulers. Even if the impact is limited, the voice of the journalist 
actually exists. And if they can not prevent the democratic transition to be built 
while leaving aside most of the people, maybe they can at least remind the leaders 
about the existence and problems of the outcasts. They can remind the leaders 
that their power is limited and that the democratic process is something one has 
to work on continuously because it is never achieved. 
44. Le Forum de la Semaine n°23, September 19th-25th 1990. 
45. Haské n°34, April 29th-May 6th 1992. 
46. L'Opinion n°7, June 22nd-July 6th 1990. 
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Press pluralism and political pluralism appeared almost at the same time in West 
African countries going through democratic transition. Newspapers and political 
parties multiplied between National Conferences and the first democratic election. 
In Benin, about 40 newspapers and 30 political parties were created during the 
transition period while in Niger 15 newspapers and 25 parties were born. Most 
of the urban French-speaking elite then supported the press and got involved in 
political groups. ' 
But that time of hope and enthusiasm was followed by disappointment. Many 
civil-servants, students, who had been demonstrating during the early political 
awakening and had filled the reader's columns in the new private press became 
embittered. They realized that democratic transition had not brought along immediate 
change in their daily life, they noticed that most of the new political leaders had 
authoritarian tendencies or were merely searching for personal enrichment, they 
understood that the so-called "democrats" all had more or less strong links with 
the former regimes. They also turned away from a private press that had gradually 
become more "sensational" and was on the pay roll of political parties. 
In Europe, democracy has been developing, with ups and downs over the past 
two centuries. Obviously, it could not be perfect after only a couple of years 
in West Africa. The way to democracy is "a long painful process of learning"
47, 
writes La Gazette du Golfe. It is therefore quite understandable that the people, 
who hoped that the new-born democracy would bring an immediate answer to 
all their problems, should now be disappointed. But that disappointment should 
not bring the people to doubt about the legitimacy of the democratic process itself. 
The Nigérien newspaper Haské wrote: "In front of the failure of the transition 
period, some people are about to think that since that transition was the expression 
of a democratic process, then democracy is not good for Niger. With that type 
of reasoning, we'll soon be ready to be ready for the return of the "authoritarian 
saviour".
4
8 
Currently, Benin and Niger are both at a turning point of their democratic process. 
In Benin, the former communist military dictator Mathieu Kérékou has won the 
presidential election in March 1996. In Niger, on January 29th 1996, a military 
coup overthrew the democratic rulers that had been quarrelling one another for 
47. La Gazette du Golfe n°57. 
48. Haské n°48, December 9th 1992. 
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Ibrahim Bare Mai'nassara, was elected President during contested elections last 
July. Is it, in both countries, the actual "return of the authoritarian saviour" that 
Haské had predicted ? After "démocratisation", should we talk of "restoration"? 
Ibrahim Bare Mai'nassara, congratulating Mathieu Kérékou after his victory in 
presidential election, said that it again showed "disillusion with this démocratisation 
in which people have placed so much hope, particularly in West Africa". The 
Nigérien evolution just reminds us that there is a very easy replacement solution 
to cope with the difficulties of inventing African style democracy. And the events 
in Benin prove how politics remain within the hands of the same dominant elite 
mainly concerned by personal career and enrichment. The new government 
appointed by Kérékou is composed mostly of former political rivals who only 
got together to fight Soglo. The lack of cohesion of the team and its inefficiency 
are already provoking much anxiety. 
Nevertheless, some of the principles or benefits of the democratic process seem 
to be deeply rooted in both countries. The private press is among those gains: 
the journalists want to believe that never again they will stand as "muffled drums"
4
9 
(Hachten, 1971). Even though the number of newspapers has decreased (except 
during election periods when new papers always multiply), even though the ones 
that remain have a poor circulation and a sometimes appalling content, the private 
African press is still an actor of the democratic implementation. And its main 
quality, in a very unfavourable context, probably remains... its existence! 
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